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Abstract
We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous ﬁr m st h a tf a c eb o t hﬁnanc-
ing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The ﬁnancing constraint implies that ﬁrms
cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that
they can only sell their ﬁxed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine
the cyclical behavior of aggregate ﬁxed investment, variable capital investment, and output
in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three
main results. First, the eﬀect of the irreversibility constraint on ﬁxed capital investment
is reinforced by the ﬁnancing constraint. Second, the eﬀect of the ﬁnancing constraint on
variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the inter-
action between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material
deliveries of US manufacturing ﬁrms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are
highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.
JEL classiﬁcation: D21, E22, E32, G31
Keywords: Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, Investment
∗I am most grateful to Nobu Kiyotaki for his encouragement and valuable feedback on my research. I would
also like to thank Kosuke Aoki, Orazio Attanasio, Steven Bond, Heski Bar-Isaac, Antonio Ciccone, Vicente Cunat,
Janice Eberly, Ashok Kaul, Aubhik Khan, Francois Ortalo-Magn˙ e, Steve Pischke, Vincenzo Quadrini, Michael
Reiter, Julia Thomas and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions
of this paper, as well as the participants in the 2004 workshop on ”Dynamic Macroeconomics” in Hydra, in the
”Capital Markets and the Economy” workshop at the 2003 NBER Summer Institute, in the 2003 EEA meetings
in Stockholm, and in the LSE, FMG and UPF seminars. All errors are, of course, my own responsibility. Research
support from the Financial Markets Group and from Mediocredito Centrale are gratefully acknowledged. Please,
address all correspondence to: andrea.caggese@econ.upf.es or Pompeu Fabra University, Department of Economics,
Room 1E58, Calle Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A body of theoretical literature has shown that asymmetric information and contract incomplete-
ness may limit ﬁrms access to external ﬁnance and thus make them unable to fund proﬁtable
investment opportunities.1 Over the past 20 years several authors have investigated if ﬁnancing
constraints are an important determinant of the investment at ﬁrm level and of the cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations of aggregate investment and output. During the same period other authors have studied
the eﬀect of the irreversibility of investment on capital accumulation and aggregate investment
dynamics.2
The motivation of this paper is that these constraints have always been analyzed in isolation,
with very few exceptions (Scaramozzino, 1997 and Holt, 2003). Therefore little is known about
the interactions between irreversibility and ﬁnancing constraints. In this paper we develop a
model of ﬁrm investment with both irreversibility of ﬁxed capital and borrowing constraints. We
show that these constraints interact and reinforce each other, that these interactions amplify the
eﬀect of these constraints on ﬁrm level and aggregate investment, and that they are important to
understand the dynamics of investment over the business cycle.
Our model has three distinctive features. First, output is produced by a risk neutral proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrm which operates a concave risky technology using two complementary factors of
production, ﬁxed and variable capital. Second, new investment in ﬁxed capital takes one period
to produce output, while new investment in variable capital is immediately productive. Moreover,
the ﬁxed capital stock cannot be disinvested unless the whole business is sold, while variable
capital is fully reversible. Third, the ﬁrm’s only source of external ﬁnance is debt secured by
collateral assets.
We show that the irreversibility and the ﬁnancing constraints interact and their eﬀects amplify
each other. This ampliﬁcation is both static and dynamic. The static component is intuitive. If a
ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained then it can only invest if it has available internal funds. Therefore
a negative exogenous shock that reduces the ﬁnancial wealth of a ﬁrm also reduces its investment
capacity. If ﬁxed capital is irreversible, then this reduction is absorbed by a reduction in variable
capital investment. The dynamic component is less intuitive but not less important. It implies that
a binding irreversibility constraint greatly increases the intensity of future ﬁnancing constraints.
As an example, consider a ﬁrm which faces a persistent negative productivity shock and expects
negative proﬁts for some periods. Fixed capital is ineﬃciently high because of the irreversibility
constraint, and this reduces proﬁts, the return on capital and the market value of the ﬁrm. Suppose
now that the ﬁrm also faces capital market imperfections. Negative proﬁts reduce the ﬁnancial
wealth of the ﬁrm and increase the probability of facing a binding ﬁnancing constraint in the
future. If the negative shock is very persistent, ﬁnancial wealth may be reduced up to the point
where both constraints are simultaneously binding. In this case ﬁxed capital is ineﬃciently high
but also variable capital is ineﬃciently low. The unbalanced use of the two factors of production
1Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Besanko and Thakor (1986), Milde and Riley (1988), Hart and Moore (1998),
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
2See Caballero (1999) for a review of the literature about investment with real constraints and Hubbard (1998)
for a review of the literature about investment with ﬁnancing constraints.
2increases losses and further reduces ﬁnancial wealth and variable capital investment. When the
bad period ends and productivity starts to increase, the ﬁrm, if it managed to avoid default,
is very cautious about investing in ﬁxed capital. This is because it fears the consequences of
future irreversibility and ﬁnancing constraints. Therefore the interaction between these constraints
increases the volatility of variable capital during downturns and reduces the volatility of ﬁxed
capital during upturns.
We use this model with interacting ﬁnancing and irreversibility constraints to explain why
inventories are very volatile and why they respond asymmetrically over the business cycle. The
high volatility of inventories has been documented by Ramey (1989), Blinder and Maccini (1991)
and Ramey and West (1999). Moreover, the same authors show that inventory investment is pro-
cyclical, and that the drop in inventories accounts for a large part of the GDP decline in recessions.
This indicates that inventory dynamics are important to understand business cycle ﬂuctuations.
However it remains an open question if there is more commovement between inventories and out-
put during recessionary than during expansionary periods. In the empirical section of the paper
we provide new evidence on this issue. We analyze the dynamics of output, material deliveries
and input inventories of several two digits durable goods manufacturing sectors, using quarterly
data from 1962 to 1996. We ﬁnd that both input inventories and deliveries are signiﬁcantly more
procyclical around recessionary than expansionary periods. In almost all the sectors considered,
the procyclicality of inventories completely disappears if we only analyze periods in which output
is above its trend.
In order to explain this empirical evidence we calibrate our model to simulate the behaviour of
an industry with many heterogeneous ﬁrms. We model material deliveries and input inventories
as the gross ﬂow and the end of the period stock of variable capital respectively. We simulate
several artiﬁcial industries, over many periods, with and without ﬁnancing imperfections and
irreversibility of ﬁxed capital. The simulated data show that the interactions between the ﬁnancing
and the irreversibility constraint are essential to generate the high volatility of inventories and
deliveries relative to ﬁxed capital, as well as their asymmetric behavior in the diﬀerent phases of
the business cycle.
Four recent papers adopt a similar approach to our paper, and analyze an economy with
heterogenous ﬁrms where ﬁnancing constraints are binding for a fraction of them in equilibrium:
Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004), Gomes (2001) and Jermann
and Quadrini (2006). In particular Cooley and Quadrini (2001) show that ﬁnancing imperfections
in a model of industry dynamics explain a stylized fact regarding growth dynamics of ﬁrms which
is not explained by models based only on technological shocks. Moreover our paper is also related
to the irreversibility literature, and in particular to Bertola and Caballero (1994), Abel and Eberly
(1999) and Veracierto (2002). Finally, our paper is related to Holt (2003), who analyses the eﬀects
of the interactions between the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraints on the dividend policy
along the life cycle pattern of ﬁrms.
Yet, our paper is substantially diﬀerent from all those above. We focus on the interactions
between ﬁnancing and irreversibility constraints as well as on business cycle dynamics rather than
growth dynamics of ﬁrms. We model theoretically and quantify with simulations a precautionary
3eﬀect of future expected ﬁnancing constraints on risky investment. We model theoretically an
ampliﬁcation eﬀect between the irreversibility and the ﬁnancing constraint and show that such
eﬀect is essential for explaining the cyclical ﬂuctuations of variable capital in the US manufacturing
sector.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates the empirical evidence regarding the
dynamics of input inventories and deliveries in the US manufacturing sector; section 3 illustrates
the theoretical model; section 4 compares the empirical evidence with the simulation results;
section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Summary of the empirical evidence
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we will analyze the dynamics of input inventories
in the durable manufacturing sector. Ramey andW e s t( 1 9 9 9 )s h o wt h a ti n v e n t o r yi n v e s t m e n t
is procyclical, and that even though the stock of inventories at the economywide level is small
relative to GDP, the reduction in inventories account for a large part of the decline in GDP during
recessions. One explanation of this evidence is that inventories generally exhibit very high short
term volatility (Hornstein, 1998), and there is nothing speciﬁc about the behavior of inventories
during recessions with respect to the other phases of the business cycle. If this is true, then we
should observe that inventory investment increases as sharply (relative to sales) during upturns
as it decreases during downturns. In this section we will show that this is not the case for the
input inventories in the US manufacturing sector, which are signiﬁcantly more procyclical during
downturns than upturns periods. This happens both for the whole of the manufacturing sector
and for single two digits durable manufacturing industries. We focus on input (materials and work
in progress) rather than output inventories, because Ramey (1989), Blinder and Maccini (1991)
and Humpreys, Maccini and Schuh (2001) show that input inventories are larger and much more
volatile than ﬁnished goods inventories, especially in the durable goods sectors.
Second, we will show that the procyclicality and asymmetric behavior of inventory investment
is always mirrored by a similar procyclicality and asymmetric behavior of material deliveries. In
order to explain this empirical evidence, in the next sections we will model variable capital as
a factor of production. We will interpret the gross investment in variable capital as the ﬂow of
deliveries, and the net change in the end of the period stock of variable capital as the investment in
input inventories. Following Humpreys, Maccini and Schuh (2001) we deﬁne deliveries as follows:
deliveriesy,q = usage of materialsy,q + ∆input inventoriesy,q
where y denotes the year (from 1962 to 1996) and q denotes the quarter. Input inventories
are materials plus work in progress. Since quarterly data about the usage of materials are not
available, we estimate them as follows:




This calculation should be suﬃciently accurate since the ratio between usage of materials and
output is fairly stable in the short term. In tables 1-3 we illustrate the volatility, procyclicality,
4and asymmetric behavior of material deliveries and input inventories. Table 1 shows the main
statistics for the two digits durable manufacturing sectors for which the Bureau of the Census
provides detailed historical data.3 Industry statistics conﬁrm the empirical evidence, documented
by Humpreys, Maccini and Schuh (2001) for the total manufacturing sector, that input inventories
are more volatile than ﬁnished goods inventories. Moreover deliveries are more volatile than sales
in all sectors. The last two columns show that both investment in input inventories and deliveries
are procyclical.4 T h ef a c tt h a tt h eh i g hv o l a t i l i t ya n dp r o cyclicality of input inventories has a
direct counterpart in the volatility and procyclicality of the ﬂow of material deliveries is already
noted by Humpreys, Maccini and Schuh (2001). Using annual data about the durable goods
manufacturing sector, they show that input inventories are very volatile and procyclical mainly
because deliveries drop more than usage of materials during downturns and increase more during
upturns.
The next three tables answer the following question: is such procyclicality uniform in the
diﬀe r e n tp h a s e so ft h eb u s i n e s sc y c l e ?T a b l e s2a n d3provide a negative answer to this question.
The ﬁrst half of Table 2 shows the correlation between ∆inventoriest
salest and salest separately for
diﬀerent sub-periods. This correlation is signiﬁcantly positive in the periods in which sales are
below their trend, while is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the periods in which sales are
above their trend. This is true for the total of the manufacturing sector and for 5 out of 7 two digits
sectors. Moreover this correlation is larger when detrended sales are decreasing than when they
are increasing. The second half of table 2 provides a similar picture regarding the procyclicality
of deliveries.
These statistics are consistent with the fact that the drop in inventories accounts for a large
fraction of the drop of GDP during recessions. They also show that the asymmetric behavior
of input inventories is mirrored by the one of material deliveries. In the next section we will
show that the interaction between the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraint generates ﬁrm
dynamics consistent with this empirical evidence. The explanation provided by our theoretical
model is based on the following intuition. At the beginning of a downturn the negative aggregate
productivity shock implies that some ﬁrms would like to downsize their ﬁxed assets, but they are
prevented to do so by the presence of the irreversibility constraint. As the downturn continues
and productivity and revenues worsen, some of these ﬁrms may also have a binding ﬁnancing
constraint, and hence they may be forced to reduce their investment in variable capital. If this
explanation is correct, we expect that the elasticity of deliveries to sales increases conditional
on a sequence of negative shocks. Table 3 conﬁrms this. It shows the estimated elasticity of
deliveries to sales conditional on the number of periods of subsequent reduction or increase in
detrended real sales. During periods of contracti o ni ns a l e sw eo b s e r v et h a ti n5o u to f7s e c t o r s
the elasticity tends to increase conditional on the contraction lasting longer. This is especially
true for sectors 34, 35, and 38. These sectors are also those with the highest degree of asymmetry
3Source: M3 survey (http://www.census.gov/indicator/www/m3/hist/m3bendoc.htm).
4The correlation coeﬃcients regarding inventory investment are smaller in absolute values than the similar
coeﬃcients estimated by Ramey and West (1999). This is due to some diﬀerences in the way we compute the
statistics. We consider durable manufacturing sectors and input inventories while Ramey and West consider the
whole of domestic sales and total inventories. We apply the HP ﬁlter while Ramey and West apply a linear trend.
5in the procyclicality of input inventories and deliveries (see table 2). The same is not true during
periods of expansion in sales. Here the elasticity of deliveries does not have any clear increasing
or decreasing pattern.
Finally, our theory predicts that ﬁnancing constraints are an essential factor to generate the
asymmetry in the dynamics of input inventories and deliveries. If we accept the view that small
ﬁrms face tighter constraints than large ﬁrms, then we should observe that such asymmetry is
stronger for smaller rather than larger ﬁrms. Unfortunately we do not have the availability of
data disaggregated in the size dimension. Nonetheless the size distribution of the two digits
manufacturing sectors is consistent with this prediction. Apart from sector SIC 32, which does
not show any signiﬁcant procyclicality of deliveries in the ﬁrst place, The three sectors that showed
the highest degree of asymmetry in the procyclicality of deliveries and input inventories are also
those with the highest density of small ﬁrms. The percentage of total payroll from ﬁrms smaller
than 50 employees is equal to 41%, 24% and 8% in sectors SIC 34, SIC 35 and SIC 38 respectively.
Conversely the same percentage is as small as 4.7% for the SIC 36 sector, the only one in which
t h ea s y m m e t r yg o e si nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n .
3T h e m o d e l
In this section we develop a model that studies the interactions between ﬁnancing and irreversibil-
ity constraints. We consider an industry populated by many ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm chooses investment
in ﬁxed and variable capital in order to maximize the expected discounted sum of future dividends.
As all ﬁrms have access to the same risky technology, we will describe and solve the optimal in-
vestment problem of one generic ﬁrm. kt and lt are respectively the stock of ﬁxed and variable
capital. Variable capital represents variable inputs such as raw materials and work in progress,
while ﬁxed capital represents ﬁxed inputs such as plant and equipment. For simplicity, labour is
not considered in the analysis. However, the inclusion of an additional factor of production would






t with α > 0;β > 0;α + β < 1( 1 )
θt is a stationary autoregressive stochastic process representing the productivity shock. Vari-
able capital lt is immediately productive, and is reversible. Fixed capital purchased at time t takes
one period to become productive and once installed it cannot be liquidated unless the whole of
the assets is sold. This means that, if the ﬁrm continues the activity in period t, ﬁxed capital kt+1
is subject to the following irreversibility constraint:
kt+1 ≥ (1 − δk)kt (2)
δk is the depreciation rate of ﬁxed capital. Constraint (2) is justiﬁed by the fact that in
many industries plant and equipment do not have a secondary market because they cannot be
easily converted to other productions. It is also consistent with the empirical evidence from a
large sample of US manufacturing plants analyzed by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995).
Moreover, constraint (2) implies that ﬁxed capital is fully irreversible. Another possibility would
6be to assume partial irreversibility (ﬁxed capital has a resell price lower than its value in the ﬁrm).
As long as the wedge between the selling price and the internal value is not negligible, both full
and partial irreversibility would generate similar qualitative results.
We introduce ﬁnancial markets imperfections by assuming that equity ﬁnance and risky debt
are not available. Moreover we follow other studies, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in
assuming that collateralized debt is the only source of external funding. We assume that at time t
the ﬁrm can borrow (and lend) one period debt, with face value bt, at the market riskless rate r. A
positive (negative) bt indicates that the ﬁrm is a net borrower (lender). The amount of borrowing
is limited by the following constraint:
bt ≤ τkkt + τllt (3)
τk and τl are the shares of ﬁxed and variable capital that can be used as collateral:
τk ≤ (1 − δk)
2 (4)
τl ≤ 1 − δl (5)
δl is the depreciation rate of variable capital. Fixed capital is accepted as collateral because
constraint (2) does not apply when the whole of the assets are liquidated. Constraints (4) and
(5) holding with equality imply that the end of period t residual capital is fully collateralisable.5
In the case of constraint (4) the term 1−δk is squared because at the beginning of period t capital
kt has already depreciated at the rate δk (see equation 8), and therefore at the end of period t the
residual value of one unit of kt is equal to (1 − δk)
2.
The timing of the model is the following: the ﬁrm inherits from time t−1t h eﬁxed capital kt
and the net worth wt. At the beginning of period t the shock θt is realized, and the ﬁrm can either
liquidate or continue activity. If the ﬁrm is liquidated its assets are sold and its net worth wt is
distributed as dividends. If the ﬁrm continues activity it pays the ﬁxed cost F>0a n db o r r o w s
one period debt with face value bt, receiving the discounted value bt/R. The net worth wt plus
the new borrowing bt/R are allocated between dividends, variable capital and ﬁxed capital:




dt ≥ 0( 7 )
5Constraints (4) and (5) holding with disequality are equivalent to assume that the ﬁrm can “steal” a (1 − τ)
fraction of the residual value of capital. To assume that lt is collateralisable is equivalent to assume that the ﬁrm is
given short term trade credit by its suppliers, who then discount such credit at a bank, which is willing to assume
the liability because this is secured by the value of variable capital. Regarding ﬁxed capital, the results of the
model are not sensitive to whether we assume kt or kt+1 to be available as collateral in period t. Therefore we
chose the more realistic assumption. kt is phisical capital existing at the beginning of time t,a n dc a nb eo b s e r v e d
by the lenders at the time they lend the funds. Conversely kt+1 is ﬁxed capital that will be in place only at the
end of period t.
7dt are the dividends distributed at time t. After producing the ﬁrm repays the debt bt at the
end of the period. Therefore residual net worth at the end of period t is:6
wt+1 = yt − bt +( 1− δk)kt+1 +( 1− δl)lt (8)
The ﬁxed cost F ensures that on average a signiﬁcant fraction of ﬁrms earn negative proﬁts. In
addition to generating realistic dynamics of revenues and proﬁts, this assumption ensures that a
positive fraction of ﬁrms have both the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraint binding. In
the next section we will show that the interaction between the two constraints is essential for
the results obtained in the simulations of the model. Furthermore, the timing assumptions in
equations (6) and (8) imply that ﬁxed capital takes two period to generate revenues. This is
because ﬁxed capital purchased at time t − 1 generates output in period t, but yt cannot be used
to ﬁnance period t investment, because it enters the law of motion of wealth at time t +1( s e e
equation 8). This timing assumption is necessary because if we allow yt to enter the law of motion
of wealth at time t, then equation (6) would imply that variable capital investment could be paid
with its own revenues. In this case ﬁnancing constraints would be binding only for a negligible
share of ﬁrms in the simulated industries.7
Liquidation at the beginning of period t c a nh a p p e nf o rt w od i ﬀerent reasons: i) exogenous
liquidation, with probability 1−γ. This ensures that the distribution of ﬁrms does not degenerate
to the point where all ﬁrms are very wealthy and no one is ﬁnancially constrained. ii) Voluntary
liquidation. After observing θt, the ﬁrm decides to liquidate before paying the ﬁxed cost F if the
net present value of continuing activity is lower than the liquidation value of the assets of the
ﬁrm. In theory the contemporaneous presence of the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraint
can also cause an endogenous “ineﬃcient” liquidation where a ﬁrm is forced to sell the business
in order to repay the debt, even though the business has a positive net present value. In practice,
however, ineﬃcient liquidation is never part of the set of optimal choices conditional on the set of
parameters we use for the simulations.
We formulate now the intertemporal maximization problem. We denote the expected value
of the ﬁrm at time t,a f t e rθt is realized, and conditional on not liquidating in period t, by
V
stay
t (wt,θt,k t), where wt, θt and kt are the three state variables of the problem:
V
stay





Et [Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)] (9)
Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)i sd e ﬁned as follows:
Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)=γSt+1V
stay
t+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)+( 1− γSt+1)wt+1 (10)
6Equations (1) and (8) imply that one unit of installed ﬁxed capital kt+1 is fully productive in period t +1 ,
while it’s market value is reduced by the depreciation rate δk.
7This is because variable capital investment, lt − (1 − δl)lt−1, is on average much larger than ﬁxed capital
investment, kt+1 −(1 − δk)kt−1. In the calibration of the model with quarterly data, lt/kt+1 is on average around
1, δk around 3% and δl around 50%.
8St is a binary variable. It is equal to one if both the following conditions are satisﬁed:
V
stay








kt ≥ F (12)
and is equal to zero otherwise, indicating that the ﬁrm is liquidated. Condition (12) rules out
ineﬃcient liquidation, because it ensures that a ﬁrm with positive net present value also has
enough resources to pay the debt and to continue activity. This condition is determined using
equation (6) to substitute bt in the collateral constraint (3) and then substituting dt = lt =0a n d
kt+1 =( 1− δk)kt.8
The ﬁrm’s problem is deﬁned by equation (9) subject to constraints (2), (3), (6) and (7).
The solution to the problem is obtained using a numerical method, and is illustrated in detail
in appendix A. A unique solution to this problem may not exist in general, because equation
(10) implies that Vt+1 may not be concave. However for the sets of parameter values chosen for
the simulations presented in the next sections we have veriﬁed, after solving the problem, that
the computed function Et [Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)] is concave in (wt,θt,k t), and therefore also the
function V
stay
t (wt,θt,k t) is concave, and the solution found is thus unique.
In the remaining parts of this section we provide a description of the ﬁrst order conditions of
the problem in the special case when endogenous exit never happens in equilibrium (St =1f o r
any t). This simple case is useful to illustrate the eﬀects of the interactions between the ﬁnancing
and the irreversibility constraint on investment decisions. We substitute St = St+1 =1 a n d
Vt = V
stay
t in equations (9) and (10), obtaining:





Et [γVt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)+( 1− γ)wt+1]( 1 4 )
Let µt λt and φt be the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the constraints (2),(3) and (7).
Also let πt+1 be the value at the beginning of period t +1o ft h eg r o s se c o n o m i cp r o ﬁts realized
by the ﬁrm during period t:






8Condition (12) implies that wt is always large enough so that, by setting lt,d t and kt+1 as low as possible, the
ﬁrm is always able to satisfy the budget constraint. This condition is violated if wt is low enough. In order to see
this, we substitute wt in condition (12) using equation (8), and we consider the “worst case scenario” in which the
ﬁrm was lacking the funds to invest in variable capital in the previous period: yt−1 =0 ,l t−1 =0 ,b t−1 = τkkt−1





(1 − δk) − 1
¸
kt−1 (13)
If τk is greater than zero, condition (13) cannot be satisﬁed even if F =0 . But with F =0a n yﬁrm, no
matter how small its scale of activity is, has a positive net present value of the discounted stream of future proﬁts.
Therefore condition (13) implies that in the worst case scenario a ﬁrm may decide to liquidate even though, if
capital was reversible, it would have been proﬁtable to continue.
9The cost of ﬁxed capital depreciation, δkkt, is multiplied by the term Λt+1 which takes into
account that the cost of capital is aﬀected by the shadow value of money in period t+1 relative to
the shadow value in period t. Λt+1 is inversely related to γ because with probability 1−γ the ﬁrm
liquidates at the beginning of period t before the installed capital kt can be used for production.
Substituting dt in equation (14) using equation (6) and taking the ﬁrst order conditions of equation
(14) with respect to bt,l t and kt+1, it is possible to show that the solution of the problem is given
by the optimal sequence of {kt+1,l t,b t,d t,λt,µ t,φt | kt,w t,θt,Θ}
∞
t=0 which satisﬁes equations (2),
(16), (17), (18) and (19), plus the standard complementary slackness conditions on λt,µ t and φt:














































∂lt are the marginal gross proﬁts of ﬁxed and variable capital
respectively.9 Equation (19) combines the budget constraint (6) and the collateral constraint (3)
and implies that the downpayment necessary to ﬁnance kt+1,l t and dt must be lower than the







downpayment necessary to buy one unit of variable capital. λt is positive when the ﬁnancing
constraint is binding in period t (equation 19 is holding with equality), and is equal to zero
otherwise. φt is positive when the ﬁnancing constraint is binding in period t or has some probability





jEt (λt+j)( 2 0 )
Equation (20) implies that a positive φt represents the additional value of ﬁnancial wealth
for the ﬁrm in terms of its ability to reduce ﬁnancing constraints. As long as φt > 0t h e n
the gross return on money invested in the ﬁrm is higher than the gross market return R,a n d
the ﬁrm does not distribute dividends (dt = 0). Equations (17) and (18) are the ﬁrst order










are the marginal cost and the marginal gross proﬁts of ﬁxed capital
respectively. Capital kt+1 is purchased at time t, generates output during period t + 1 but the
corresponding proﬁts become available at the beginning of period t +2 , and therefore they are
evaluated at their expected shadow value φt+2.µ t is positive when the irreversibility constraint
9The value of πl
t+1 is known at time t because it does not depend on the term Λt+1.




is the cost of future
expected irreversibility constraints. In the next subsections we will describe the main qualitative
features of the model. We will ﬁrst analyze the solution without the ﬁnancing constraint, then we
will analyze the solution without the irreversibility constraint, and ﬁnally we will explain how the
two constraints interact with each other.
3.1 Solution with the irreversibility constraint only
In this subsection we rule out current and future expected ﬁnancing constraints by assuming that
w0, the initial wealth of the ﬁrm, is high enough so that the borrowing constraint (3) is never
binding. This means that λt =0f o ra n yt, and the ﬁrst order conditions (16), (17) and (18) can
be simpliﬁed as follows:
φt =0 ( 2 1 )
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Equations (2), (22) and (23) jointly determine µt,l t and kt+1. They describe the solution to
a version of a well known irreversible investment problem (e.g. see Bertola and Caballero, 1994).
Since we allow for a multifactor production technology the consequence is that lt, the reversible
factor, is more volatile than kt, the irreversible factor, both after a positive and a negative shock.
This follows from the comparison of equations (22) and (23). Equation (22) implies that variable
capital always reacts to both positive and negative productivity shocks. Constraint (2) instead
implies that, after a negative productivity shock at time t, kt+1 cannot be reduced below (1 − δk)kt,







decreases and is compensated by an increase in µt on the right





because constraint (2) can be binding at time t + 1 conditional on a future negative shock. The












3.2 Solution with the ﬁnancing constraint only
In this section we rule out current and future expected irreversibility constraints by assuming
that both variable capital and ﬁxed capital are reversible, and the irreversibility constraint (2) no















− (1 + φt)r = Rλt − γτkEt (λt+1)( 2 4 )
In this case equations (16), (17), (19) and (24) jointly determine φt,λt,l t and kt+1.I ft h eﬁrm
does not have enough resources to invest optimally, then constraint (19) is binding with equality
and both λt and φt are positive. Equations (17) and (24) imply that a positive λt increases both πl
t+1
11and πk
t+2, and this reduces both lt and kt+1. Suppose instead that the constraint (19) is not binding,
but there is a positive probability to face future ﬁnancing constraints. In this case λt = 0 but
Et (λt+1)a n dφt are positive. Equation (17) simpliﬁes to equation (22), because future expected
ﬁnancing constraints do not directly aﬀect lt, the variable capital investment decisions. Regarding
ﬁxed capital, equation (24) implies that ﬁnancing constraints expected at time t +1h a v et w o
counteracting eﬀects on kt+1. First, higher expected ﬁnancing constraints increase γτkEt (λt+1),










the required gross return on capital, and increases kt+1. Second, equation (17) implies that Et (lt+1)
decreases in Et (λt+1). This means that the more the ﬁrm is expected to be ﬁnancially constrained
in the next period, the lower is the expected level of variable capital investment lt+1.S i n c e
kt+1 and lt+1 are complementary, it follows that the lower is Et(lt+1), t h el o w e ri st h ee x p e c t e d
proﬁtability of ﬁxed capital, and the lower is kt+1. Simulation results show that this negative
eﬀect always dominates on the positive eﬀect of the term γτkEt (λt+1). The implication is that
two ﬁrms with identical technology and identical proﬁtability, and both currently not ﬁnancially
constrained, may choose very diﬀerent ﬁxed capital investment levels depending on their level
of wealth, because the latter aﬀects future expected ﬁnancing constraints. In section 4 we will
show that this “precautionary” eﬀect on investment is quantitatively important, and reduces the
volatility of ﬁxed capital in a way that is similar to the eﬀect of convex adjustment costs.
3.3 Solution with the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraints
We now consider the solution of the problem with both constraints. Instead of describing in detail
such solution, we focus only on the most interesting feature, namely the fact that the irreversibility
and the ﬁnancing constraint interact and reinforce each other. Not only do ﬁnancing constraints
increase the cost of future irreversibility constraints, but also the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital
ampliﬁes the eﬀects of ﬁnancing constraints on variable capital investment. In order to see this
we evaluate equation (19) for dt =0a n dkt+1 =( 1−δ)kt. This allows us to deﬁne an upper limit
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The left hand side of equation (25) is the downpayment necessary to buy the variable capital
lt.
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kt is the minimum ﬁnancing needed to sustain the current level of ﬁxed capital.
Suppose now that the ﬁrm is hit by a persistent and negative productivity shock, so that both
the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraints are binding at times t and t +1 . By evaluating














Because δk, the quarterly depreciation rate of ﬁxed capital, is typically very small, equation (26)
implies that the reduction in wealth caused by the negative shock (∆wt+1 < 0) is mainly absorbed
by a negative change in variable capital (∆lt+1 < 0). This reduces the ratio
lt+1
kt+1 below the optimal
level. The unbalanced use of the factors of production reduces the productivity of ﬁxed capital
12and the ﬁrm’s output. This means that if a similar negative shock also hits the ﬁrm in period
t + 2 it will cause a bigger reduction in wt+2 and lt+2, and will further reduce the productivity of
ﬁxed capital and output, and so on.
We now illustrate the opposite ampliﬁcation eﬀect: future expected ﬁnancing constraints in-
crease the expected cost of a binding irreversibility constraint and reduce the incentive to invest
in ﬁxed capital. First we notice that, when both constraints are binding, µt is determined by




















t+1+j + Rλt+j − γτkλt+1+j
i
(27)
In order to interpret equation (27) it is useful to evaluate it for the case of no ﬁnancing

























is positive if the irreversibility constraint is binding in period
t + j. Therefore equation (28) shows that µt is the expected discounted sum of the marginal
loss in revenues caused by the fact that the stock of ﬁxed capital is ineﬃciently high when the
irreversibility constraint is binding. Now compare equation (28) with equation (27). In the latter
case, where the ﬁrm also faces ﬁnancing imperfections, µt increases in Et (Rλt+j − γτkλt+1+j).
This term is positive, and represents the net cost of future expected ﬁnancing constraints. The
intuition is that the lower return on capital caused by the irreversibility constraint is going to be a
bigger problem when the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained, and must rely on internal funds to ﬁnance
investment. Therefore ﬁnancing constraints increase the cost of irreversibility µt. But this implies




when the irreversibility constraint is not currently
binding, and so they make the ﬁrm more cautious about investing in ﬁxed capital.
4 Numerical Solution and simulations
4.1 The solution of the investment problem
We solve the intertemporal maximization problem using a numerical method (see appendix B for
details). Adding the subscript i to indicate the generic i−th ﬁrm, the solution consists of the opti-
mal policy functions ki,t+1 (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t)a n dli,t (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t), the associated Lagrange multipliers
λi,t (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t),µ i,t (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t)a n dφi,t (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t), the value function V
stay
i,t (wi,t,θi,t,k i,t)






i,t is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, and εt is the industry-wide shock common to all ﬁrms.
εt is introduced in order to study the implications of the model for the dynamics of investment
at the industry level. The model is otherwise partial equilibrium, with constant interest rate and
13constant relative prices normalized to 1. Both θ
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t ∼ iid N (0,σ2
ε) (31)
In all the following simulations θ
f
i,t and εt are discretised respectively as two states and eight
states symmetric Markov processes:
θ
f
i,t {θL,θH} where θL < θH
εi,t {ε1,ε2,...,ε8} where ε1 < ε2 <. . .<ε8
The calibrated parameters are illustrated in table 4. We calibrate the model to match the long
run averages of output and capital stock for the ”Fabricated Metals Sector” in the US from 1962 to
1995 (source: NBER-CES manufacturing industry database, SIC code 34). Therefore the ability
of the model to explain the cyclical ﬂuctuations of investment will be measured by comparing
the statistics from the simulated industry with the corresponding empirical data for the SIC 34
sector. This sector has been chosen as a generic representative one, but the theoretical model
can be applied to any other sector where productive units use a combination of reversible and
irreversible factors of production and can be subject to borrowing constraints. In fact in section
2 we showed that the stylized facts that this model aims at explaining are common to the whole
of the US manufacturing sector as well as to almost all the 2 digits durable goods manufacturing
sectors. The main advantage of using this sector, rather than the whole manufacturing industry,
is that it has an high density of small ﬁrms. The SIC 34 sector is populated by many ﬁrms, 36429
according to the statistics for year 1992, the majority of which were small ﬁrms: 40.8% of the
total payroll was generated from ﬁrms with less than 50 employees. Therefore it is reasonable to
assume that a large share of these ﬁrms is aﬀected by ﬁnancing imperfections, like the ﬁrms in
the simulated industry.
In calibrating the model the set of technological parameters α,β, δl, θ,ρε and σε are chosen to
match the aggregate statistics about the SIC 34 sector. δl is set in order to match the average life
of materials, with the following procedure: in the model (1−δl)lt is the residual value of variable
capital at the end of period t, after production takes place. Therefore we interpret (1 − δl)lt as
the stock of input inventories, and the gross investment in variable capital can be interpreted as
deliveries:
deliveriest = lt − (1 − δl)lt−1 (32)
Total variable capital available for production in period t is lt, and δllt can be interpreted as




input inventories at the end of year t
usage of materials in year t
(33)
14Solving for δl we obtain:
δl =
1
input inventories at the end of year t
usage of materials in year t +1
(34)
In the empirical data the ratio
input inventories at the end of year t
usage of materials in year t is approximately equal to one during
the sample period. Thus δl is calibrated to be equal to 0.5. θ is calibrated to match the average
size of the ﬁrm. The elasticities α and β match a chosen level of return to scale of 0.97, which
is consistent with empirical micro studies (Burnside, 1996), and the average ratio of ﬁxed over
variable capital. ρε and σε are chosen in order to match the volatility and autocorrelation of
aggregate output for the detrended series of the SIC 34 sector.
The parameters F, w0 and γ aﬀect the distribution and the turnover of ﬁrms in the simulated
industry. They are jointly set to match the following statistics: i) the average fraction of ﬁrms
that report negative net income in the US. Since this information is not available for the SIC 34
sector, we calculate it from a sample of more than 1300 US industrial companies drawn from the
Worldscope Database and analyzed in Caggese (2006). ii) The turnover rate. In the model a ﬁrm
that exits production is a ﬁrm that liquidates all its assets and is replaced by a newborn ﬁrm.
Therefore this turnover can be interpreted as either ﬁrms destruction or as property change (the
new ﬁrm acquires the assets of the liquidating ﬁrm). The annual average plant destruction rate in
the SIC 34 sector has been 6.4% for the 1995-2000 period.10 T h er a t eo fo w n e r s h i pc h a n g ef o rt h e
plants in the manufacturing sector can be inferred from “The Manufacturing Plant Ownership
Change Database” (Nguyen, 1998). By dividing the number of ownership changes with the total
number of plants surveyed, we calculate an annual rate of approximately 7.5%. In the model this
corresponds to a quarterly turnover rate of 3.67%.11 iii) The size distribution of ﬁrms.
The parameters δk, σθ and ρθ are calibrated to jointly match the average, the standard deviation
and the autocorrelation of the investment rate in ﬁxed capital. Since this information is not
a v a i l a b l ef o rt h eS I C3 4s e c t o r ,w em a t c ht h ev a l u e sf o rt h eC o m p u s t a ts a m p l ep r o v i d e db yG o m e s
(2001). Table 4 shows that the matching of the volatility and the autocorrelation of ﬁrm level
investment is not perfect. One reason is that the mapping between the parameters and the
moments matched is very nonlinear, and the volatility and persistency of the idiosyncratic shock
aﬀects contemporaneously many of the other moments, both at the ﬁrm and at the industry level.
In particular it is diﬃcult to match the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the ﬁxed capital investment
rate because of the absence of convex adjustment costs in the model. Despite this, the model with
both constraints is still able to generate a positive autocorrelation of the ﬁxed capital investment
rate, because current and future expected ﬁnancing constraints dampen the reaction of ﬁxed
capital to the productivity shocks, as illustrated in section 3.2 and in ﬁgure 1.
Regarding the ﬁnancial parameters we set r, the quarterly real interest rate, equal to 1%.
Moreover we assume that the lenders cannot enforce the liquidation of variable capital to repay
10Both the exit rate statistics and the ownership change statistics actually refer to plants rather than to ﬁrms.
But most of the ﬁrms in the SIC34 sector are small single plant ﬁrms, and therefore these statistics are a good
approximation of their rate of turnover.
11This value is calculated by considering that the annual destruction rate and the property change rate are
calculated on ﬁrms existing at the beginning of the year, and by assuming that the destruction probability is
independent from the property change probability. Since we set γ =0 .965, the exit rate of 3.75% in the simulated
industry corresponds to 3.35% quarterly rate of exogenous liquidations and 0.4% of voluntary liquidations.
15the debt. Therefore τl, the fraction of variable capital that c a nb eu s e da sc o l l a t e r a l ,i ss e te q u a l
to zero while τk matches the debt/assets ratio observed on average in the US corporate sector.
This choice of allocating all the collateral capacity to the ﬁxed capital is not necessarily consistent
with the empirical evidence. However the results of the model are not sensitive to diﬀerent
assumptions regarding τk and τl, as long as a signiﬁcant fraction of ﬁrms is ﬁnancially constrained
in equilibrium. The last two columns of table 4 report the empirical moments matched in the
calibration and the corresponding moments in the simulated industry with both constraints.
In the next sections we compare the simulations of the industry with the ﬁnancing and irre-
versibility constraints with three alternative industries, one with only the ﬁnancing constraint, one
with only the irreversibility constraint, and one with no constraints. The benchmark parameters
for all the industries are illustrated in table 4.12
Figures 1(I) and 1(II) show the value of the multipliers λt (wt,θt,k t)a n dφt (wt,θt,k t)a n dt h e
policy functions lt (wt,θt,k t)a n dkt+1 (wt,θt,k t)i nt h es p a c eo fwt/kavg and for selected values
of kt and θt.k avg is the average optimal ﬁxed capital for an unconstrained ﬁrm. θt is chosen so
that ﬁgures 1(I) and 1(II) represent the investment decision of a ﬁrm with a negative idiosyncratic
productivity shock (θ
f = θL and ε = ε7). Figure 1(II) illustrates the policy function of a ﬁrm
that is only subject to the ﬁnancing constraint, and hence is free to adjust ﬁxed capital, while
ﬁgure 1(I) illustrates the policy functions of a ﬁrm which is also subject to the irreversibility
constraint. For both ﬁgures kt is chosen at an intermediate level so that, in the case of ﬁgure
1(I), the irreversibility constraint is not binding unless wealth is very low. The most interesting
comparison is for values of wealth lower than W∗,w h e nt h eﬁnancing constraint is binding and λt
is positive. In this case equation (19) holds with equality and dt = 0. Therefore a decrease in wt






lt + kt+1. I nt h ec a s eo fﬁgure 1(II), the drop
in wealth is mostly absorbed by a drop in ﬁxed capital. This is because the ﬁnancing constraint
is binding and hence the value of internally generated money is higher than the market price of
it. φt (the “ﬁ” line), the extra return of the funds invested in the ﬁrm, can be as high as 7% for
very low levels of ﬁnancial wealth. This means that it is very proﬁt a b l et og e n e r a t em o r eo u t p u t
today, and the ﬁrm prefers to use its limited ﬁnancial resources to invest in variable capital, which
is immediately productive, and to reduce the investment in ﬁxed capital.
In ﬁgure 1(I) both constraints are binding for levels of wealth below W∗∗. In this case a drop
in ﬁnancial wealth must be absorbed by a drop in variable capital. Lower variable capital means
that the ﬁrm produces less output today, generates less cash ﬂow, and is expected to face even
worse ﬁnancial conditions in the future. The magnitude of this ampliﬁcation eﬀect is summarized
b yt h ef a c tt h a tw h e nwt is very low, λt is up to ten times higher in ﬁgure 1(I) than in ﬁgure
1(II). The consequence is that φt c a nb ea sh i g ha s5 8 %i nﬁgure 1(II). This extreme value of φt
12The main diﬀerence between the parameter sets of each industry is the diﬀerence in the volatility and persistency
of the productivity shock. In the industry with only the irreversibility constraint it is necessary a very high
persistency of the idiosyncratic shock to generate some autocorrelation in the ﬁxed capital investment rate. ρθ is
equal to 0.98 against ρθ =0 .7 in the industry with both constraints. In the industries with only the ﬁnancing
constraint and with no constraints it is not possible to match the autocorrelation of the ﬁxed capital investment
rate, no matter how close to 1 ρθ is. Therefore we choose to set ρθ =0 .7 in the industry with only the ﬁnancing
constraint (the same as for the industry with both constraints). and ρθ =0 .98 for the industry with no constraints
(the same as for the industry with only the irreversibility constraint).
16has a very low probability to happen in equilibrium, while values of φt between 10% and 15% are
more frequent among the simulated ﬁrms with both constraints binding. Such values imply that
the ﬁrms would be willing to pay between 44% and 64% annual interest rate to obtain additional
ﬁnance. This may still seem an unrealistically high value, but actually the annualized interest
rate that ﬁrms implicitly pay on trade credit is often found to be above 40% (Ng et Al, 1999).
One interesting feature of the policy functions, present in both ﬁgures 1(I) and 1(II), is the
fact that ﬁxed capital is sensitive to ﬁnancial wealth when the ﬁnancing constraint is not currently
binding. As we mentioned in the previous section, this happens because ﬁxed capital investment is
negatively aﬀected by future expected ﬁnancing constraints. This “precautionary saving” eﬀect is
measured in ﬁgure 1(I) as the diﬀerence between ku
t+1 and k∗
t+1. The ﬁrst value, ku
t+1, is the optimal
ﬁxed capital when wt is high enough so that the ﬁrm is not currently ﬁnancially constrained. The
second value, k∗
t+1,i st h eo p t i m a lﬁxed capital when wt is so high that the ﬁrm also does not
expect to be ﬁnancially constrained in the future. This precautionary reduction in ﬁxed capital
is especially large when the current stock of ﬁxed capital kt is small. In this case ku
t+1 can be up
to 30% smaller than k∗
t+1.
4.2 Dynamics of aggregate output and investment
In this section we will use the solution of the model to simulate the investment and production
path of many heterogeneous ﬁrms. We will show that the combination of the irreversibility and
the ﬁnancing constraint generates cyclical ﬂuctuations of investment and output consistent with
the empirical evidence illustrated in tables 1-3. In the simulated industry all ﬁrms are identical ex
ante, but each of them is subject to a diﬀerent realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
θ
f
i,t, which is uncorrelated across ﬁrms and serially correlated for each ﬁrm. The distribution of
{wi,t,k i,t} across ﬁrms depends on the set of exogenous parameters, on the initial distribution of
{wi,0,k i,0} and on the history of aggregate shocks {εj}
t
j=0. In this section we compare the empirical
data from the SIC 34 Sector with the data of several artiﬁcial industries. For each industry we
simulate 50000 ﬁrms for 10000 periods. In each period a fraction 1− γ of ﬁrms is liquidated. We
assume that an identical number of new ﬁrms enters production, so that the total number remains
constant. Each newborn ﬁrm draws the initial value of θ
f from a uniform distribution, has an
endowment of w0 and a ﬁxed capital level of k0.w 0 is a key parameter to determine the aggregate
distribution of wealth and the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. If w0 is too small then no ﬁrm ever
manages to expand enough to become unconstrained, and all ﬁrm are liquidated after few periods
of life. If w0 is too large then all ﬁrms can expand to the level at which they are never ﬁnancially
constrained. In the industry with both constraints w0 is calibrated to be 33% of the average ﬁxed
capital of unconstrained ﬁrms. It is possible to show that for this value of w0 a stochastic steady
state exists such that a fraction of ﬁrms is on average ﬁnancially constrained, and among those
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction is contemporaneously ﬁnancially and irreversibility constrained. Regarding
k0, we assume that the initial level of ﬁxed capital of a ﬁrm that enters production at time t is ex
ante optimal, conditional on the information set at time t − 1.
Tables 5-7 compare output and investment dynamics of the ﬁrms in the SIC 34 sector (ﬁrst
17column) with the dynamics of the ﬁrms in four diﬀerent artiﬁcial industries. These are simulated
using the parameters shown in table 4, and correspond to the four versions of the model described
in the previous section: without any constraint, with one of the two constraints only, and with
both constraints. For the empirical data we compute ﬁxed capital considering only the stock of
equipment. This is because land and buildings are more likely to be subject to other type of
adjustment costs besides the irreversibility constraint, which is the only type of real constraint
considered in the model. For the simulated data, since we do not model ﬁnished goods inventories,
sales and output coincide. The objective of this simulation exercise is to verify the ability of the
model to replicate the following empirical evidence: i) the relative volatility of deliveries with
respect to ﬁxed capital; ii) the procyclicality and asymmetric behaviour of deliveries.
The last column in table 5 reports the simulated statistics for the industry without the irre-
versibility and the ﬁnancing constraint. In this case the ﬁxed capital stock is approximately as
volatile as sales are. Deliveries are more volatile than ﬁxed capital because they are measured as
the gross investment in variable capital (see equation 32). This is, by construction, more volatile
than the stock of variable capital lt, which in the frictionless case is as volatile as ﬁxed capital kt.
The correlation between the deliveries/sales ratio and the level of sales is positive and much larger
than zero. This is due to the time to build assumption about ﬁxed capital. After a positive shock
ﬁrms can immediately increase variable capital input, while investment in ﬁxed capital takes one
period to become productive. Therefore deliveries increase proportionally more than sales after a
positive shock. This can be interpreted as an increase in capacity utilization of the existing ﬁxed
capital stock. The time to build assumption alone can account for the procyclicality of deliveries,
but it cannot account for its asymmetry: the procyclicality of deliveries is symmetrical across
expansion and contraction phases.
The next column illustrates the statistics for the industry with the irreversibility constraint
only, and shows a reduction in the volatility of ﬁxed capital relative to the volatility of deliveries
and sales. This is because in every period the irreversibility constraint is binding for a fraction
of ﬁrms. These ﬁrms cannot change ﬁxed capital in response to a negative productivity shock.
Despite the irreversibility constraint is on average binding for as much as 32% of the ﬁrms, the
increase in the volatility of variable capital relative to ﬁxed capital is small. This is because the
two factors of production are complementary. Therefore after a negative shock if a ﬁrm is unable
to reduce ﬁxed capital it has also less incentive to reduce variable capital deliveries. This implies
that the lower volatility of ﬁxed capital also causes a lower volatility of deliveries.
Regarding the asymmetric behaviour of deliveries in the business cycle, deliveries are more
procyclical during upturns than during downturns. Therefore the introduction of an element
of asymmetry in the model, the irreversibility constraint, generates an asymmetry in deliveries
that is opposite to the one observed in the empirical data. Also this ﬁnding is explained by the
complementarity of the two factors of production. In the simulated industry a downturn begins
with a negative aggregate productivity shock that reduces output. As long as the low productivity
persists, aggregate ﬁxed capital is gradually reduced towards the new optimal level. The fact
that irreversibility is binding for some ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a ta g g r e g a t eﬁxed capital is ineﬃciently
high, and hence also variable capital deliveries are higher than otherwise. The ineﬃciently large
18capital implies that output drops more than variable capital during a downturn, and hence the
deliveries/sales ratio is less procyclical in this phase than during an upturn.
The next column shows the simulated data for an industry with the ﬁnancing constraint only.
The relative volatility of deliveries is higher than in the two previous industries. The reason is that
in this industry on average 43% of the ﬁrms have a binding ﬁnancing constraint. For these ﬁrms the
level of variable capital is ineﬃciently low, and hence its marginal productivity is high, leading
to an higher sensitivity of variable capital to the productivity shock. Interestingly, ﬁnancing
constraints reduce the volatility of ﬁxed capital more than the irreversibility constraint. This
is due to the dampening eﬀect of future expected ﬁnancing constraints on current ﬁxed capital
investment decisions. Regarding the cyclical behaviour of variable capital, also this simulated
industry is not consistent with the asymmetry of deliveries over the business cycle. Financing
constraints increase the procyclicality of deliveries during expansion phases, as it happened in the
industry with only the irreversibility constraint.
The next column shows the results of the simulation of an industry with both the ﬁnancing
and the irreversibility constraint. In this industry the ratio of the volatility of deliveries with
respect to the volatility of ﬁxed capital increases substantially, and is closer to the one observed in
the empirical data. Moreover table 6, on the second row, shows that in this industry the relative
volatility of input inventories is almost identical to the one in the data. The ratio of the volatility
of input inventories over ﬁxed capital is 3.14 in the data and 3.36 in the industry with the ﬁnancing
and the irreversibility constraint. Surprisingly, no additional convex or concave adjustment cost
is needed to generate this result. This is due to the interactions between the two constraints.
As explained in section 3.3, on the one hand the ﬁnancing constraint ampliﬁes the cost of future
expected irreversibility constraints and discourages ﬁxed capital investment. On the other hand
the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital ampliﬁes the eﬀect of ﬁnancing constraints on deliveries when
both constraints are binding. One way to quantify this ampliﬁcation eﬀe c ti st on o t i c et h a ti fw e
add the irreversibility constraint to the industry with no frictions, the ratio between the volatility
of deliveries relative to the volatility of ﬁxed capital increases only by 5%. Instead, if we add the
irreversibility constraint on top of the ﬁnancing constraint, this ratio increases by 75%.
More importantly, the model with both constraints is consistent with the asymmetric behaviour
of deliveries in expansion and contraction phases. Deliveries are more volatile than sales during
periods in which sales are below trend, as it happens in the empirical data. The intuition for
this result is that in this industry at any point in time a fraction of ﬁrms has both constraints
currently binding. These ﬁrms, during a downturn, are forced to reduce deliveries in response
to the reduction in proﬁts and wealth. This eﬀect more than counterbalances the fact that the
more wealthy ﬁrms in the sample only have the irreversibility constraint binding and hence do
not reduce deliveries with the same intensity. Less intuitive is the reason why deliveries are not
procyclical during upturns. In ﬁgure 1 and in section 4.1 we have shown that when both constraints
are binding the shadow cost of money for the ﬁrm reaches very high levels. Therefore also the
marginal productivity of variable capital is very high, and when a positive aggregate shock hits
and positive proﬁts are realized, a small increase in deliveries generates large increases in output,
and hence deliveries increase less than output for these ﬁrms. The ability of the model to match
19the observed behaviour of deliveries is important, because the asymmetric behaviour of deliveries
is empirically closely related to the asymmetric dynamics of input inventories, as shown in table
2. Table 6 reports the procyclicality of inventory investment for the empirical data and for the
simulated industries. Since we interpret the stock of variable capital at the end of period t, (1−δl)lt,
as input inventories, (1−δl)(lt−lt−1) can be interpreted as inventory investment. Also in this case
the industry with both constraints is the only one that reproduces the asymmetry in inventory
dynamics found in the empirical data. Our model therefore provides a theoretical justiﬁcation of
the stylized fact that input inventories are very procyclical especially during recessionary periods.
Furthermore, it is consistent with the ﬁnding of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1996) who observe that at the beginning of a recession inventories decline much
m o r ei ns m a l lr a t h e rt h a ni nl a r g eﬁrms. Tables 6 shows that the asymmetric behaviour of input
inventories in the industry with both constraints is entirely driven by the smaller ﬁrms.
The asymmetric behaviour of deliveries in the industry with both constraints is also reﬂected
in the elasticity of deliveries to sales. Table 7 shows the estimated elasticity of deliveries to sales
conditional on the number of consecutive periods of decreasing and increasing sales. For the
simulated data the elasticity of deliveries to sales is very large in the ﬁrst period of both expansion
and contraction phases because ﬁxed capital does not initially adjust to the new productivity
shock. Therefore the sensitivity of output to the shock is less strong than the sensitivity of
variable capital. In order to abstract from this eﬀect we compare, in the bottom part of table 7,
the ratio between the elasticity of deliveries to sales in contraction and expansion periods. In the
industry with both constraints this ratio is higher in the second and third period with respect to
the ﬁrst period, as it is in the data, while it is generally lower in the other simulated industries.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We now present a sensitivity analysis of the main results obtained in table 5. In ﬁgures 2 and 3 we
analyze the eﬀect of a gradual increase in w0, and hence of a reduction in the intensity of ﬁnancing
constraints, on the simulated statistics. In the previous section we claimed that the interactions
between the ﬁnancing and the irreversibility constraint are necessary to generate the high volatility
of deliveries relative to ﬁxed capital and their asymmetric dynamics. Here we conﬁrm the claim
by showing that these features of the simulated industry gradually disappear when w0 increases.
In ﬁgures 2 and 3 the ratio w0/kavg is reported on the x axis. The smallest value on the x axis
corresponds to the value of w0 chosen in the simulations in the previous section. In ﬁgure 2(I)
we illustrate the relationship between w0 and the fraction of ﬁrms with a binding constraint. As
w0 increases, the fraction of ﬁrms with a binding borrowing constraint decreases. The fraction of
ﬁrms with both constraints binding is initially relatively large, but it rapidly decreases towards
zero. Therefore only ﬁrms with low wealth may experience both constraints contemporaneously
binding. On the contrary the fraction of ﬁrms with the irreversibility constraint binding increases
with w0. This is because the higher is wealth, the more ﬁrms accumulate ﬁxed capital, and the
more the irreversibility constraint is likely to bind conditional on a negative idiosyncratic shock.13
13The fraction of ﬁrms with a binding irreversibility constraint is as high as 75% when no ﬁrm is ever ﬁnancially
constrained. This value is higher than the 36% obtained from the simulations that use the calibrated parameters
20Figure 2(II) shows that the volatility of deliveries relative to the volatility of ﬁxed capital is
very high for levels of w0/kavg between 0.3 and 0.6. This happens despite in the same range of
values of w0 the fraction of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms drops from 39% to 20%. The reason is
that these ﬁrms become unconstrained but most of them still expect future ﬁnancing problems.
From our analysis in section 3.2 we know that future ﬁnancing constraints increase the cost of
future irreversibility constraints and dampen the volatility of ﬁxed capital. Therefore the relative
volatility of deliveries to ﬁxed capital remains high for these ﬁrms. When w0 further increases, the
ratio of the volatility of deliveries and ﬁxed capital decreases faster. This is because more ﬁrms
become very wealthy and with low probability of facing future ﬁnancing constraints. Finally,
ﬁgure 3 analyzes the asymmetry in the procyclicality of deliveries as a function of w0, and shows
that such asymmetry gradually disappears as w0 increases.
4.4 Irreversibility and aggregate output volatility
Veracierto (2002), in a general equilibrium real business cycle model with heterogeneous ﬁrms,
shows that the presence of the irreversibility constraint at ﬁrm level has negligible eﬀects on
aggregate investment and output dynamics. In this section we show that the irreversibility of
ﬁxed capital strongly reduces the volatility of output of the simulated industry when ﬁnancing
constraints are also present. This particular ﬁnding is sensitive to the assumption that relative
prices are constant in our simulated industries. But still it suggests that the irrelevance result
obtained by Veracierto (2002) may change if ﬁnancing constraints were to be introduced in a
simulated general equilibrium economy.
In table 8 we show the results of four simulated industries. The ﬁrst column replicates the
statistics of the industry with both constraints, previously reported in table 5. The second column
illustrates the statistics of an industry that has the same parameters of the industry of the ﬁrst
column, but that is not subject to irreversibility constraints. The fourth column replicates the
results of the industry with only the irreversibility constraints, previously reported in table 5.
Finally the ﬁfth column uses the same parameters of the industry in the fourth columns, but
once again it relaxes the irreversibility constraint. Therefore the comparison of columns one
and two is an estimation of the partial equilibrium eﬀect on aggregate output of eliminating the
irreversibility constraint in an industry with ﬁnancing imperfections. The comparison between
columns four and ﬁve is the same exercise on an industry without ﬁnancing imperfections. In
the latter case output volatility increases by 17%. Also the relative volatilities of ﬁxed capital
and deliveries do not change much when the irreversibility constraint is eliminated. The former
case yields very diﬀerent results. If we eliminate the irreversibility constraint from an industry
with ﬁnancing imperfections, then the volatility of ﬁxed capital relative to output increases by
97%. This huge increase is due to the fact that by eliminating the irreversibility constraint we also
eliminate the interactions with the ﬁnancing constraint. The consequence is that the volatility of
for the industry with only the irreversibility constraint (table 5, column 4) because in ﬁg u r e2w eu s et h ec a l i b r a t e d
parameters for the industry with both constraints, which imply an higher volatility of the idiosyncratic shock. For
the same reason the ratio between the volatilities of deliveries and ﬁxed capital in ﬁgure 2(II) decreases from a
maximum of 3.4 to 1.9, which is less than the diﬀerence, shown in table 5, between the calibrated economies with
both constraints and with the irreversibility constraint only.
21o u t p u ti n c r e a s e sb ya sm u c ha s1 1 6 % .
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have illustrated a structural model of a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm subject to both
borrowing constraints and irreversibility of ﬁxed capital. The solution of the optimal investment
problem shows that not only expected productivity but also current and future expected ﬁnancing
constraints aﬀect investment decisions. Despite the ﬁrm being risk neutral, future expected ﬁnanc-
ing constraints may reduce current investment in ﬁxed capital. This “precautionary” reduction in
investment may substantially aﬀect aggregate investment dynamics in a way similar to the eﬀect
of convex adjustment costs.
More importantly, we have shown that the irreversibility and the ﬁnancing constraint are
complementary. Notably, the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital ampliﬁes the eﬀects of the ﬁnancing
constraint on variable capital. By simulating an artiﬁcial industry with many heterogeneous
ﬁrms we have shown that this ampliﬁcation eﬀect explains why aggregate investment in input
inventories and deliveries of US durable manufacturing ﬁrms are very volatile (relative to capital)
and procyclical, and why such procyclicality is highly asymmetrical, so that it disappears in periods
in which aggregate output is above its trend. Our model is also consistent with the stylized fact
that the procyclicality of aggregate inventories during downturns is driven by small ﬁrms.
Although we calibrate the model to match one speciﬁc US two digits durable manufacturing
sector, we show that a similar behaviour of inventories and deliveries is present also in most
other durable good sectors. More generally, the implications of the model could be useful in
understanding ﬁrm dynamics in any productive sector that satisﬁes the following assumptions:
i) both ﬁnancing and irreversibility constraints are binding for a non negligible share of ﬁrms in
equilibrium; ii) ﬁrms produce output using a combination of reversible and irreversible inputs.
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Appendix A: solution of the problem with endogenous exit:
In section 3 of the paper we illustrated the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem for the
simpliﬁed case in which endogenous exit does not happen in equilibrium. Here we illustrate the
full solution of the problem. If we substitute recursively V
stay
t+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1) in equation (9) and
we add constraints (2), (3) and (6) at times t and t+1, with the associated Lagrangian multipliers
µ,λ and φ, we can represent the problem in the following way:
V
stay
t (wt,θt,k t)=( 1+φt)
¡
wt + bt
R − kt+1 − lt
¢
+ µt [kt+1 − (1 − δk)kt]+λt [τkkt + τllt − bt]+
+ 1






R − kt+2 − lt+1
´
+











t+2 (wt+2,θt+2,k t+2)+( 1− γSt+2)wt+2
¤ªª
(35)
The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are the following:





































































24covart+1 = cov (MPKt+1,S t+1Ψt+1)( 4 2 )
Equations (16), (17) and (18) are a special case of (36), (37) and (38) for St =1f o ra n yt.
The terms Γt+1 and Ωt+1 can be shown to be always equal to zero if ineﬃcient liquidation never
happens in equilibrium.
Appendix B: numerical solution
In order to obtain a numerical solution of the dynamic nonlinear system deﬁned by equations
(2), (36), (37), (38) and (19), plus the standard complementary slackness conditions on λt,µ t
and φt,w ed i s c r e t i s et h es t a t es p a c ea sf o l l o w s : kt and wt are both discretised in a 60 points
grid, while θt is discretised in 16 elements, which correspond to the eight states of the aggregate
shock and the two states of the idiosyncratic shock. The solution of the problem is simpliﬁed
by the fact that, for all the set of parameters chosen in the paper, ineﬃcient liquidation never
happens in equilibrium, so that we can calculate the solution for the special case in which the
terms Γt+1 and Ωt+1 are always equal to zero. In order to compute the solution, ﬁrst we formulate








and covart+1. Second, we solve the static optimization problem conditional on this guess, for each









and covart+1. We repeat these steps until the value
function converges.
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Policy functions conditional on θ
f = θL, ε = ε7 and kt = 87576


















































25Figure 2: Financial wealth, fraction of constrained ﬁrms and volatility of investment (industry
with both constraints)




















Avg. % of firms with a binding borrowing
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Avg. % of firms with both constraints
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Avg. % of firms with a binding
irreversibility constraint (right scale)
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Figure 3: Financial wealth and the correlation between deliveriest
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Corr(deliveries/sales,sales):
difference between
observations below and above








0.33 0.58 0.86 1.13 1.41 1.69 1.97 2.24 2.52 2.80
Sales are below their trend
Sales are above their trend
















SIC 32 0.043 0.056 0.034 0.039 0.032 0.038** 0.006
(0.009) (0.065)
SIC 33 0.086 0.094 0.050 0.044 0.059 0.038** 0.068
(0.012) (0.023)
SIC 34 0.043 0.059 0.056 0.033 0.034 0.076** 0.180**
(0.026) (0.060)
SIC 35 0.061 0.080 0.061 0.058 0.051 0.078** 0.162**
(0.021) (0.053)
SIC 36 0.057 0.075 0.075 0.061 0.058 0.118** 0.155**
(0.019) (0.059)
SIC 37 0.066 0.083 0.058 0.066 0.053 0.040** 0.191**
(0.016) (0.035)
SIC 38 0.039 0.073 0.068 0.069 0.059 0.027 0.312
(0.031) (0.099)**
Quarterly data. Standard deviations are calculated on the trend deviations computed using the Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter
(smoothing parameter λ=1600). Standard errors are in parenthesis. The sectors are the following: SIC 32: Stone,
Clay, Glass Products. SIC 33: Primary Metals. SIC 34: Fabricated metal products. SIC 35: Industrial machinery.
SIC 36: Electronic and other electric equipment. SIC 37: Transportation Equipment. SIC 38: Instruments and related
products. **Signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level; *signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.



























All 0.109** 0.038 0.076** 0.084** 0.145** 0.091* 0.083** 0.096**
sectors (0.025) (0.033) (0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.039) (0.024) (0.024)
SIC 32 0.037* 0.040* 0.041** 0.036* 0.053** -0.029 -0.006 0.021*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.136) (0.114) (0.088) (0.099)
SIC 33 0.070** 0.006 0.037* 0.042* 0.108* 0.028 0.099** 0.044
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.044) (0.045) (0.036) (0.032)
SIC 34 0.101** 0.040 0.128** 0.022 0.280** 0.030 0.230* 0.120
(0.044) (0.058) (0.036) (0.037) (0.110) (0.130) (0.090) (0.090)
SIC35 0.174** -0.036 0.104** 0.072* 0.411** -0.133 0.213** 0.155*
(0.042) (0.048) (0.032) (0.029) (0.103) (0.118) (0.078) (0.074)
SIC36 0.063 0.175** 0.139** 0.102** 0.003 0.317** 0.108 0.199*
(0.037) (0.038) (0.029) (0.027) (0.112) (0.117) (0.088) (0.081)
SIC37 0.071** 0.002 0.0486* 0.047* 0.239** 0.129 0.186** 0.225**
(0.027) (0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.057) (0.067) (0.046) (0.055)
SIC38 0.113* -0.072 0.089* -0.007 0.569** 0.017 0.533** 0.169
(0.052) (0.057) (0.046) (0.043) (0.168) (0.185) (0.146) (0.138)
Quarterly data. The series ∆inventoriest
salest , deliveriest
salest and salest are percentage deviations from their trend
computed using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (smoothing parameter λ=1600). Standard errors are in parenthesis.
**signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level; *signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.




Contractions in Sales Expansions in Sales
1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter
Total 1.23** 1.27** 1.20** 0.93** 1.21** 1.17**
Manufacturing (0.15) (0.12) (0.37) (0.18) (0.19) (0.28)
SIC 32 0.70* 0.78* 0.99* 0.82** 1.35** 1.22
(0.33) (0.41) (0.51) (0.31) (0.34) (0.72)
SIC 33 0.79** 0.75** 1.18** 1.27** 1.17** 1.18**
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17)
SIC 34 1.15** 1.66** 1.98* 1.14* 1.18** 0.91**
(0.36) (0.29) (0.83) (0.49) (0.31) (0.31)
SIC 35 1.41** 1.77** 2.06** 0.67* 0.53 1.00**
(0.24) (0.45) (0.29) (0.34) (0.38) (0.34)
SIC 36 1.37** 0.99** 1.30** 0.20 1.28** 1.34**
(0.31) (0.34) (0.40) (0.46) (0.42) (0.34)
SIC 37 1.09** 1.21** 0.76** 0.96** 1.00** 0.58
(0.12) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.14) (0.48)
SIC 38 1.19* 1.66* 1.77 1.98** 0.59 1.79*
(0.46) (0.77) (1.22) (0.58) (0.61) (0.83)
The estimated elasticities conditional on more than three consecutive periods of contraction or expansion in
detrended real sales are not reported because too few observations do not allow us to estimate signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. Standard errors are in parenthesis. **signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level; *signiﬁcant at the
95% conﬁdence level.
29Table 4: Benchmark parameters
Calibrated parameters Matched moments







α .08 .75 .088 .072 kt/lt 1.063 1.02
β .89 .895 .882 .898 returns to scale 0.973 0.97
δl .5 .5 .5 .5
usage of materials
input inventories ≈13 1
ρa .9 .9 .95 .9 corr(yt,y t+1) 0.773 0.70
σa .0015 .002 .0075 .0097 st.dev.(salest) 0.0433 0.043
θ .8354 .8356 .8267 .8258 average size2 588513 58851
γ .97 .968 .98 .964 % ﬁrms ≤ 90% size 71%3 70%
F1 .013 .013 .010 .012 quarterly turnover 3.67%3 3.75%
w1
0 n.a. n.a. .19 .33 fraction of negative proﬁts 37%4 42%
δk .035 .035 .035 .03 it
kt 0.1455 0.140














τl n.a. n.a. 0 0 (imperfect enforceability)
τk n.a. n.a. .679 .679 debt
assets 0.36 0.32
r .01 .01 .01 .01 quarterly real interest rate 1% 1%
I: Industry with no constraint. II: Industry with only the irreversibility constraint. III: Industry with only the
ﬁnancing constraint. IV: Industry with both constraints. 1: Both F and w0 are expressed as fractions of the
average size of ﬁxed capital of a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm. 2: Size in terms of ﬁxed assets. 3: Moments
computed using the aggregate data for the SIC34 sector. 4: Moments computed using the Worldscope Database.
5: Compustat data from Gomes (2001). 6: US corporate sector.
30Table 5: Simulated statistics











st.dev. Sales2 0.0429 0.0434 0.0449 0.0482 0.0424
st.dev.(deliveries)
st.dev.(sales) 1.38 - 1.161 1.26 1.40 1.26 1.36
st.dev.(fixed capital)
st.dev.(sales) 0.411 0.37 0.72 0.93 1.05
st.dev.(deliveries)
st.dev(fixed capital) 2.791 3.42 1.94 1.35 1.29
corr(deliveriest/salest,salest)
All periods 0.18** 0.24 0.33 0.28 0.33
Below trend 0.28** 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.29
Above trend 0.03 0.13 0.31 0.26 0.29
Decrease in sales 0.23* 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.25
Increase in sales 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.24 0.23
% of binding
ﬁnancing constraint N/A 39% 43% 0% 0%
% of binding
irreversibility constraint N/A 29% 0% 36% 0%
%o fb o t h
constraints binding N/A 9% 0% 0% 0%
1.Based on yearly data. 2. Standard deviations of percentage deviations from the trend. 3. Despite simulate
data are stationary, we apply the same Hodrick Prescott ﬁlter used on the empirical data, in order to ensure
that similar frequencies are ﬁltered. **signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level; *signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence
level.
31Table 6: Simulated statistics, input inventories












st.dev.(sales) 1.29-1.301 1.24 1.54 1.29 1.38
st.dev.(inventories)
st.dev(fixedcapital) 3.141 3.36 1.71 1.37 1.30
corr(∆inventoriest/salest,salest)
All ﬁrms
All periods 0.076** 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.33
Below trend 0.101* 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.30
Above trend 0.04 0.12 0.38 0.29 0.27
Decrease in sales 0.128** 0.30 0.20 0.18 0.29
Increase in sales 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.25 0.17
Smaller ﬁrms
Below trend N.A. 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.30
Above trend N.A. 0.04 0.29 0.21 0.27
Larger ﬁrms
Below trend N.A. 0.32 0.33 0.23 0.26
Above trend N.A. 0.27 0.35 0.30 0.25
1. Based on yearly data. **signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level; *signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
Table 7: Sales elasticity of deliveries




































delt+1 (3rd qt.) 1.98 0.95 0.86 0.81 0.56
Decrease/increase
1st quarter 1.01 0.96 1.00 1.01 1.05
2nd q. 1.41 1.98 0.67 0.72 0.98
3rd q. 2.17 1.48 1.17 1.36 0.98
32Table 8: Irreversibility and output volatility












st.dev. Sales 0.0434 0.0939 116% 0.0482 0.0563 17%
st.dev.(deliveries)
st.dev.(sales) 1.26 1.33 5.5% 1.26 1.33 5.8%
st.dev.(fixed capital)
st.dev.(sales) 0.37 0.73 97% 0.93 1.04 11.3%
st.dev.(deliveries)
st.dev.(fixed capital) 3.42 1.84 -46% 1.35 1.28 -4.9%
Set of parameters 1: parameters used in the benchmark calibration of the industry with both constraints. Set
of parameters 2: parameters used in the benchmark calibration of the industry with only the irreversibility
constraints.
33